The limits of robotic solutions to human challenges in the land domain

In the face of rapid technological change and the creation of ambitious military modernisation programmes, this paper argues that land forces, in managing the relationship between force levels and the adoption of military robotics, must recognise that there are inherent limits to techno-centric force reduction efforts and realise the inefficacy of substituting skilled soldiers with robots. It begins with an overview of how the proper integration of robotics into a military’s force structure can improve capability, save lives and potentially reduce costs, but suggests that common accounts of robot utility are exaggerated and endanger the risk assessment processes governing the adoption of said technologies and relevant personnel settings. The paper explores the limits of robotic solutions to military problems, discussing their technical limitations, redundancy and related issues that, when combined with a technico-moral skills degradation problem also detailed within, point to the need to reshape force structures to suit the adoption of robotics while preserving existing levels of human staffing.     

Hardening the Hard,Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance.     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.     

伞翼无人机线性自抗扰高度控制

针对伞翼无人机参数不确定性和复杂环境干扰敏感的问题,提出一种伞翼无人机线性自抗扰(Linear Active Disturbance Rejection Control,LADRC)高度控制方法。建立伞翼无人机8自由度飞行动力学模型,并引入风场和降雨模型以更加准确地模拟真实飞行环境。基于LADRC确定总体控制架构,设计线性扩张状态观测器对所有扰动进行估计,并引入误差反馈率在控制中实时补偿。使用该控制方法在多种扰动工况下进行伞翼无人机高度控制仿真实验。仿真结果表明,基于LADRC的高度控制方法能够有效克服内扰和外扰的影响,实现高精度高度控制;与传统PID控制效果相比,LADRC控制器具有更好的抗扰能力和鲁棒性。     

基于不稳定性采样的主动学习方法

传统的主动学习方法往往仅基于当前的目标模型来挑选样本,而忽略了历史模型所蕴含的对未标注样本预测稳定性的信息。因此,提出基于不稳定性采样的主动学习方法,依据历史模型的预测差异来估计每个未标注样本对提高模型性能的潜在效用。该方法基于历史模型对样本的预测后验概率之间的差异来衡量无标注样本的不稳定性,并挑选最不稳定的样本进行查询。在多个数据集上的大量实验结果验证了方法的有效性。     

电传动装甲车辆负载功率预测实时能量管理策略

针对电传动装甲车辆负载功率预测功能缺失导致控制作用滞后的问题,提出一种具有较高负载功率预测精度的实时能量管理策略。在分析整车结构的基础上,采用理论分析和数据拟合方法,建立各动力源数学模型。将差分自回归移动平均模型和自适应马尔可夫链两种预测方法相结合,设计非平稳趋势性负载功率组合预测方法。在非线性模型预测控制框架下,构建多目标优化函数,采用序列二次规划法在有限时域内实时求解最优控制指令,优化多动力源协调控制过程。依托硬件在环仿真平台进行多路面行驶实验,对比有无功率预测的能量管理控制效果。结果表明,改进的实时能量管理策略对未来负载功率具有较好的预见性,能够显著优化多动力源协调控制过程,提升车辆燃油经济性,稳定母线电压和电池荷电状态,对传统模型预测控制下的工程应用场景具有一定借鉴意义。     

面向数字射频存储的雷达欺骗干扰检测方法

基于数字射频存储(digital radio frequency memory,DRFM)技术的转发式欺骗干扰与真实雷达回波高度相干,这导致雷达难以分辨真假目标。针对该问题,提出一种基于Hough变换的DRFM欺骗干扰检测方法。建立基于线性调频的干扰信号模型,分析其谐波分量的频谱特性,采用短时傅里叶变换和二维恒虚警率检测器对干扰信号进行特征提取,并利用Hough变换完成欺骗干扰检测。所提方法是基于DRFM欺骗干扰本身的特征,不依赖于先验信息与应用场景,计算复杂度低,且在低信噪比条件下具有良好的检测性能。计算机仿真实验验证了方法的有效性。     

The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982–2006

This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to ‘chouannise’ Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798

Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’.